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Reviewed by James Haywood Rolling, Jr., Teachers College, Columbia University 
 
 
I was a student of architecture long before I became a student of the visual arts.  
Last year, an exhibition titled ‘Frank Gehry, Architect’ at the Solomon R. Guggenheim 
Museum, New York, offered welcome evidence that the two disciplines are not far afield 
from each other.  I would argue—and so did this exhibition—that they are in fact 
contiguous practises within a shared domain of knowledge construction.  Or at very least 
they are aligned and correlated in my own mind and educational experience.  Gehry has 
become internationally renowned because the combination of a unique architectural 
vocabulary, an iconoclastic use of materials, a penchant for collaborations with 
contemporary artists, and an idiosyncratic approach to the design process and the 
development of form have all come together as an integrated aesthetic ‘sensibility that 
melds architecture and sculpture in exuberant buildings’ (From wall bio at Guggenheim 
exhibition, installed May 18th – August 26, 2001).  
I have to admit that a large part of what drew me to this exhibition was the 
prospect of satisfying my yen for viewing maps and models, the inordinate fixation to 
know the underlying purpose beneath the façade which all former architecture students 
are invariably left with.  (That, along with the incapacity to inhibit one’s use of 
unrelentingly legible block lettering.)  Purposeful coherence is of course one of the goals 
of all maps and models.  This is no less the case in Arthur D. Efland’s newly released Art 
and Cognition: Integrating the Visual Arts in the Curriculum (2002).  This new tome sets 
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for itself the admirable task of coherently mapping variously situated theories of 
cognition, and from an integration of those theories, modeling a rationale for the 
necessary integration of arts learning in general education curriculum.  As Efland builds 
his thesis, each chapter closes with a brief examination of implications for education in 
the arts, aesthetics or general education. 
Efland’s effort stems from his belief that works of art require a particular rigour of 
intellectual inquiry to make meaningful sense, and become of value to the learner first 
and foremost because they are context-bound creations.  Consequently, works of art may 
be understood as personally relevant artifacts only when they are grasped holistically—in 
their interconnectedness within the social settings couching each individual’s personal 
experience.  Through his definition of works of art as context-bound, Efland claims that 
the task before the learner is to resituate these domain-specific bodies of knowledge over 
to a position of personal relevance and interpretation and to find a cognitive strategy for 
doing so.  Or rather, it is the task of educators to facilitate such transferences from 
context-boundedness to personal utility, aiding the learner’s creation of newer bodies and 
boundaries of knowledge.  Efland boldly takes us then to where the positivist bias in the 
human sciences will not allow us to go—toward the proposition that reductivist and 
scientific methodology is not ‘the only way to procure reliable knowledge’ (p. 5).  
Efland’s aim draws upon an architectural metaphor: to ‘build a foundation for lifelong 
learning inclusive of the arts’ (p. 6).   
According to Efland’s thesis, this all becomes possible assuming that one pictures 
the mind as more than a hierarchical repository of logical-scientific symbolic structures, 
more than a socially situated field of enculturated symbols mediated by parents, peers, 
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and knowledgeable adults.  Rather, Efland portrays a mind flexible enough to employ 
different strategies appropriate to the mastery of understanding in pre-packaged, 
generalizable, and well-structured domains of knowledge as well as ill-structured, broad 
and complexly fragmented arrays of knowledge—yet able to integrate the variety of 
knowledge domains and arrays into coherent and purposeful maps and models of the 
world. 
Ultimately, the book purports the mind’s imagination to be the most flexible and 
integrative of all the symbol-processing tools at our disposal, powerfully formative and 
capable of ‘creating new ideas or images through the combination and reorganization of 
previous experiences’ (p. 133).  The imagination can acquire other cultural tools such as 
language, mathematics and works of art and then utilize them in continually reshaping an 
individual’s lifeworld in accommodation to the dispositions of the learner, also described 
as the learner’s ‘habits of mind’ (p. 118).  Learning and the creation of new knowledge 
may thus be preceded by imaginative, even artistic, purpose and development. 
 
Efland begins to make his case for linking artistic development more closely with 
general cognitive development in Chapter 2 of his book, presenting an extensive account 
of research strands in cognitive developmental theory as typified by the work of Jean 
Piaget and Lev Semenovich Vygotsky.  Both, in differing ways, advanced 20th century 
psychological behaviourism and its basic stimulus-response cause-effect tenets.  
Behaviourism was itself the response of cognitive psychologists to positivist demands for 
purging metaphysical speculation from a more purely scientific study of the mind and its 
behaviours.  The core of behavioural orthodoxy is that ‘[o]nly objects or events may 
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function as stimuli, and learning is determined by responses to such stimuli’ (p. 18). 
Efland notes Bruner’s citation of the 1956 publication of Bloom’s Taxonomy of 
Educational Objectives as the ‘mythical birthday’ of the cognitive revolution (p. 15). 
Bloom’s Taxonomy established a cumulative hierarchy of cognitive domains 
descending from the cognitive, to the affective, to the psychomotor.  In educational 
discourse since then, cognition has been associated with rational exercises in thinking 
which have been researched far more extensively than affective subjects or psychomotor 
embodiments.  Language arts, mathematical competence, and logical-scientific reasoning 
were viewed as the bailiwicks of the mind’s development. 
Piaget established an invariantly sequenced step theory for cognitive 
developmental studies that eschewed the onset of artistic development as an object of 
research inquiry.  According to Efland, whereas Piaget locates mind ‘in the brain of the 
lone individual’ (p. 30) and its ability to assimilate and accommodate emerging schemas 
or structures of knowledge, Vygotsky described cognitive development as part of an 
interactive process of social learning between a mind and its sociocultural environment.  
In Vygotskian theory, the brain internalizes the cultural influences that surround it; 
individual cognitive development begins in a proximal zone outside of the brain through 
symbol-driven tools, discursively mediated, serving as the stimulus for learning. 
Within Bloom’s taxonomic delineation and most of its subsequent elaborations 
throughout the course of the 20th century’s scientific and categorizing predisposition in 
developmental psychological discourse, artistic and aesthetic thinking became relegated 
to the affective category, not quite at the level of cognitive activity.  This relegation was 
conferred in spite of a range of arguments to the contrary, such as Rudolf Arnheim’s that 
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‘visual perception is visual thinking and art making is a kind of visual problem solving’ 
(Parsons, 1998, p. 81), and Michael Parsons’ (1998) that the puzzle of how to recreate a 
perception as ‘an image in the particular terms of [an art] medium’ makes the artist or the 
child a ‘problem-solver’ (p. 81). 
 
In Chapter 3, Efland traces the related emergence of three major traditions in 
cognitive theory.  The symbol processing tradition assumed an objective reality 
independent of the learner and negotiated by a mind that manifests itself in symbolizing 
cognitive activity that construes an objective version of reality through which to know the 
world outside of the mind’s operations, and processing that reality through logical 
symbols.  The sociocultural, or situated tradition assumed a socially constructed reality 
including the learner and negotiated by a mind that manifests itself in social and 
discursive interactions building conventionalized aspects of the world that simultaneously 
embed within the mind to shape perception and thinking.  The constructivist tradition 
assumed a personally constructed reality idiosyncratic to the learner and negotiated by a 
mind that manifests itself in wholly personalized strategies and agency in making 
relevant meanings.  In this chapter, Efland also lays the foundation for advancing his own 
modified constructivist theory of learning through the arts, integrating the assumptions of 
symbol processing and situatedness in development. 
 
Chapter 4 begins Efland’s exploration of a theory of cognitive flexibility that 
strategizes linkages between prior knowledge arrangements and new interpretable 
encounters largely by the overlapping of sets of information, an analogy Efland borrows 
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from urban planning.  Particularly useful is the discussion of learning and transfer 
drawing upon ‘ill-structured’ and irregular arrays of knowledge, versus that which draws 
upon ‘well-structured’ domains such as those encountered in textbooks and lectures.  
Efland quotes Spiro, Feltovich, Coulson & Anderson’s (1988) work on the flexibility and 
connectedness of knowledge acquisition and transfer in ill-structured learning contexts, 
said to be more complex a task than approaching knowledge acquisition and transfer 
from an overreliance in the neatly compartmentalized ‘pre-compiled’ schemas of well-
structured learning contexts (Efland, p. 97).  Efland settles upon the ‘hub metaphor’ 
developed by Yang (2000) as likely to prove most influential to contemporary curriculum 
development when navigating ill-structured arrays of knowledge.  Efland writes: 
 
If airlines scheduled direct flights between all of the cities they served, they would 
soon be overwhelmed by the sheer complexity of the flight schedule they would 
have to maintain. If certain cities were instituted as hubs or transfer points, the 
scheduling system could be simplified and made less cumbersome by having 
several planes, flying relatively short distances, meet at the same terminal to 
exchange passengers. (p. 103) 
 
Efland urges curriculum planners to adapt the hub metaphor toward integrating 
areas of study and helping students ‘construct possible linkages among ideas often 
isolated by arbitrary subject boundaries’ (p. 103).   Moreover Efland is now implying the 
utility of art educational models of curriculum planning to general educational practise. 
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 As Efland builds his own model of cognitive learning through the arts, Chapter 5 
allots valuable square footage to a focus on the work of Judith Koroscik and her 
associates.  Koroscik’s research has focused on learning problems in the transfer of 
knowledge from domain-specific contexts to coalesce within the framework of the 
learner’s prior knowledge base.  Throughout the book Efland does due diligence to 
comparing and contrasting a crop of theories on learning in the arts, some historical, such 
as by Bruner, Lowenfeld, Read, and Arnheim—some more contemporary, such as those 
advanced by Gardner, Wolf, Parsons, Brent and Margary Wilson, Anna Kindler, and 
Bernard Darras.  But Chapter 5 belongs to Koroscik.  The kernel that Efland seem to be 
after is in Koroscik’s (1993) research into the differing strategies novices and experts use 
in the expansion of their knowledge base, and the suggestion that works of art offer the 
possibility of integrating knowledge ‘since their interpretations utilize knowledge about 
the social and cultural landscape from which they came’ (Efland, p. 167).  Efland’s point 
is that through the arts, learners discover that irregular and ad hoc transferences between 
a work of art and one’s lifeworld are both conceivable and tenable as an extension of 
knowledge. 
The centrality of transfer to Efland’s thesis leads to a lengthy discussion in 
Chapter 6 on the importance of metaphoric and narrative constructions to the ‘higher end 
of the spectrum of human cognitive performance’ (p. 152).  Efland ultimately believes 
that ‘metaphor is an essential component of imagination in such forms of cognition as 
abstract reason’ (p. 152), imbuing learners with a leaping flexible-mindedness and 
facility for the intussusception of both situated and embodied properties which, in their 
rapprochement, establish connectivity across widely diverse human experience.  He 
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presents a metaphoric imagination as a generator of strategies for the transfer of context-
bound and domain-specific essentials over into the maps of personal understanding 
constructed by a learner, thereby a cognitive tool making possible the architecture of 
process models of reality and the enabling of abstract thought.  Efland emphasizes that 
the relevance of such a rationale for cognitive learning in and through the arts is yielded 
in that, unlike in scientific discourse where the metaphors in use tend to remain hidden, 
‘it is only in the arts where the processes and products of the imagination are 
encountered and explored in full consciousness’ and become the objects of inquiry (p. 
153, emphasis by author). 
 
If one compares Efland’s integrationist thesis with Charles M. Dorn’s 
developmental perspective in Mind in Art: Cognitive Foundations in Art Education 
(1999), one comes away with the suspicion that Efland might find Dorn’s argument that 
art in the curriculum must start with the making of art just a tad myopic.  This is not to 
denigrate Dorn’s argument, which is both valid and valuable.  I simply note here that 
Efland is more far-sighted.  To Efland, a worthwhile curriculum in the arts is not one that 
centres on the issue of transforming ideas into forms and images; to Efland, art 
curriculum is about the transfer of situated experience into abstract ideas.  In other words, 
art is in the same business as science, though science understands it not.  John C. Gilmour 
(1986) has reached the conclusion that ‘our interpretive activities fall within a general 
human intention to understand the world’ (p.152).  Science interprets the natural world 
and parses out its general laws; art also interprets the world, but seeks embody it as well, 
in visuosymbolic, musical and material exemplars that narrate the human experience. 
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But art also embodies the void…the gaps in our knowledge, our measurements, 
and models.  Coherence is vital to the well-being of human cognitive functioning; the 
alternative is not long viable—semi-conscious awareness, nonsense, insanity, and the 
paranoia of a world disintegrating into the unknowable—falling away into the void.  The 
metaphors of artistic endeavour draw upon these voids, making sense of them.  At the 
onset of cognitive operation, when almost all is unknown or unknowable, metaphoric 
leaps of thought have always aided the development of mind and identity, proliferating 
whole mental landscapes from the barest encounters and engagements with the world.  
Repeated mining of this early cognitive real estate yields raw materials for knowledge 
structures that will be replicated and recycled in mind, migrating to and fro, in refittings 
and refurbishments from one knowledge enhancing event to another.  Metaphors are 
vehicles for these refittings and refurbishments, ‘minor works of art’, each crafted of a 
keen utilitarian aesthetic (Danto, 1981 p.189).  A mind can thus made, remade, unmade, 
and made over; it is never finished.  It has no certain form. 
In an earlier exhibition catalog, The Architecture of Frank Gehry (1986), Gehry is 
quoted as insisting that he likes best the ‘poetic’ appearance of unfinished buildings and 
raw building materials, frameworks revealed.  In an interview for American Architecture 
Now, Gehry champions ‘the quality that you find in paintings by Jackson Pollock, for 
instance, or de Kooning, or Cézanne, that look like the paint was just applied’ (cited in 
Frank Gehry, Architect exhibition catalog, 2001, p. 311).  Gehry believes in turning 
unfinished materials into works of art and architecture.  He has practised the 
transformation of the humdrum mappings of topological surveys and square footage 
requirements into a continuing lattice of free-associative models derived of models, ‘free 
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play ideas’ culminating in a large-scale and inhabitable model or ‘sketch’ that remarkably 
retains the sense of being a work in progress.  Not relying upon conventional 
architectural typology, Gehry seeks a freshness born not only of this process of 
vernacular proliferation, but also out of the practise of dialogue and collaboration, 
especially with other artists.  In the process, Gehry has gone over to the use of new 
tools—first sculpting multiple solutions out of sensuously provocative materials as 
eclectic as wood, paper, adhesive tape, wax-infused velvet, glass, metal, plaster, chain 
link, mylar, and epoxy-resin fiberglas—and then three-dimensionally digitizing and 
rapidly prototyping fluid projections of these process models through powerful computer-
aided design (CAD) technology.  Gehry’s strategies produce sculpted architectural 
frameworks that are, as a body of work, extraordinarily uncertain.  It is the kind of 
learning Efland has in mind. 
Not relying upon conventional curriculum architecture, Efland seeks a fresh 
approach to general education born of a process melding conventional learning exercises 
with the sculptural sensibilities, the dialogic engagement of the senses and materials that 
is inherent to aesthetic experience.  Efland’s suggestions that educators utilize key works 
of art as landmarks for cross-disciplinary and cross-social learning, that we recognize the 
role of metaphor and narrative in providing the basis for ‘an imaginative reality’ (Lakoff 
& Johnson, 1980, p. 193), and that we understand the purpose of the arts as contributive 
to the embodiment of ‘the myths that bind human social systems together’ (p. 171), all 
rise together to form new curricular indications implying ineffables vital to the 
furtherance of the exercise of human development.  It is the kind of bold integration 
Gehry would be most happy to construct. 
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